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SILENCE IS ANYTHING BUT GOLDEN: LAWS OF
GENERAL APPLICABILITY IN INDIAN COUNTRY
Bryan R. Lynch*
On July 8, 2012, Theresa Carsten was employed by the Inter-Tribal
Council of Nevada (“ITCN”), a non-profit organization made up of twentysix federally recognized Nevada tribes, as the director of the Women,
Infants, and Children Program.1 One day later, Carsten was fired for, as she
alleged in a complaint filed against the ITCN, seeking leave under the
Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) to address a “serious medical
condition” from which she was suffering.2 In the United States District
Court for the District of Nevada, Carsten’s suit was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, as the ITCN was covered by tribal sovereign immunity.3 While
addressing the issues raised in Carsten v. Inter-Tribal Council of Nevada at
the district court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals raised one significant,
unaddressed question on which Carsten’s suit turns: Does the FMLA even
apply to Indian tribes?4
Allowing this question to remain unanswered disadvantages employees
like Theresa Carsten by depriving them of the FMLA’s benefits. Signed by
President Clinton in 1993, the FMLA was intended to “support families in
their efforts to strike a workable balance between the competing demands
of the workplace and the home.”5 The FMLA guarantees, for eligible
employees in the United States, twelve weeks of unpaid leave in a twelvemonth period to care for “newborn or adopted children, relatives with
serious medical conditions,” or the employee’s health problems. 6
Empirically, the FMLA has proven to be a beneficial tool for American
workers. When an eligible employee takes FMLA leave, employers must
maintain health insurance benefits for their employee as if no leave had

* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. Carsten v. Inter-Tribal Council of Nevada, No. 3:12-cv-00493-MMD-WGC, 2013
WL 4736709, at *1 (D. Nev. Aug. 30, 2013), rev’d, 599 F. App’x 659 (9th Cir. 2015).
2. Id.
3. Id. at *1-*2.
4. Carsten, 599 F. App’x at 660.
5. Christopher J. Ruhm, Policy Watch: The Family and Medical Leave Act, 11 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 175, 175 (1997) (quoting COMM’N ON FAMILY & MED. LEAVE, A WORKABLE
BALANCE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE POLICIES xiii (1996)).
6. Id. at 176.
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been taken and must allow employees to return to work in the same or an
equivalent position.7
While the effects of the FMLA—historically significant because it was
the first federal law in the United States to require job-protected parental
leave—have been minimal, they have been positive.8 A large majority of
employers impacted by the FMLA, more than 90%, report that complying
with the law’s requirements has “either no noticeable effect or a positive
effect on business operations.”9 From the employee prospective, 16% of
eligible workers utilize the leave available to them, while only 5% report
being unable to take leave when needed.10 Plainly, the FMLA is not a
windfall for the American worker, but it has benefited a portion of the
workforce without unduly burdening employers.
Unfortunately, considering first the contours of tribal sovereignty
relevant to the applicability of the FMLA to Indian tribes and second
judicial interpretations of laws of general applicability like the FMLA, it
remains unclear today whether these benefits extend to Indian tribes. This
Comment endorses the prevailing judicial interpretation of laws of general
applicability that would apply the protections of the FMLA to Indian tribes
as the only interpretation that best navigates all of the interests at play in
answering this question. True, this interpretation will leave employees
without the ability to enforce those protections by private lawsuit, but that
is a problem that only Congress can solve.
I. Tribal Sovereignty
Whether the FMLA applies to individuals employed by Indian tribes
turns on two questions of tribal sovereignty. First, addressed by the parties
in Carsten, are issues related to tribal sovereign immunity from suit.11
Second, raised upon appellate review in Carsten, is the sovereign right of
tribes to govern themselves, including exercising authority to regulate “the
health and safety of workers in tribal enterprises.”12 As these principles
7. Id.
8. Id. at 175.
9. News Release, Wage & Hour Div., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Family and Medical Leave
Act Benefits Workers and Their Families, Employers (Feb. 4, 2013), https://www.dol.gov/
opa/media/press/whd/WHD20130175.htm.
10. Jacob Alex Klerman, et al., Family and Medical Leave in 2012: Executive
Summary, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, (Sept. 13, 2013), https://www.dol.gov/asp/evaluation/fmla/
FMLA-2012-Executive-Summary.pdf.
11. Carsten v. Inter-Tribal Council of Nevada, 599 F. App’x 659, 660 (9th Cir. 2015).
12. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1985).
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have distinct contours, they must be addressed independently. Indeed, there
is a distinct difference between the “right to demand [a tribe’s] compliance”
with a law and the “means available to enforce” that law.13
A. Immunity from Suit
Tribal sovereign immunity from suit is a controlling principle in
determining the means available to enforce the FMLA. This immunity has
developed as a common law doctrine and is derived from the language used
in the Constitution’s Indian Commerce Clause, which treats tribes as
governments.14 Over time, the doctrine has become recognized as “a
necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance.”15 Because
of its prominence in questions of tribal governance, the Supreme Court has
often confronted questions regarding the limits of tribal sovereign immunity
from suit and found that it is a broad concept with few limitations.16
For example, in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, the Court
noted that this immunity continues to be a vital component of tribal
sovereignty.17 Therein, the state of Michigan sued the Bay Mills Indian
Community over the operation of a Class III gaming facility on land
purchased through a congressional land trust.18 The Court, in defining the
contours of tribal sovereign immunity from suit, opined that there is no
exception in this immunity “for suits arising from a tribe’s commercial
activities, even when they take place off Indian lands.”19 In fact, tribal
immunity extends to any “arms of the tribes.”20 Likewise, immunity from
suit extends to tribal officials and employees when acting within the scope

13. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 755 (1998).
14. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8; COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §
7.05(1)(a), at 636 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds, 2012 & Supp. 2017) [hereinafter COHEN]
(citing Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014)).
15. Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2030 (citing Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold
Reservation v. World Eng’g, P.C., 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986)).
16. Cohen notes that “[s]even Supreme Court cases since 1977 have delineated the
contours of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity.” COHEN, supra note 14, § 7.05(1)(a),
at 636-37.
17. 134 S. Ct. at 2030-31.
18. Id. at 2028-29.
19. Id. at 2031.
20. COHEN, supra note 14, § 7.05(1)(a), at 637 (noting that “arms of the tribes” analysis
“considers tribal involvement in the creation and control of the entity, tribal intent to clothe
the entity with immunity, and whether the entity serves tribal sovereign interests such as
economic development”).
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of their authority.21 The Court, however, has suggested that the holding of
Ex parte Young, which permits suit against individuals in their official
capacity for either declaratory or injunctive relief, extends to Indian tribes.22
Nonetheless, this exception is decidedly narrow, permitting only suits
against individuals in their official capacity for declaratory or injunctive
relief.23
While the reach of tribal immunity from suit is expansive, it is not an
absolute shield to all suits. For example, suits filed by the United States are
never barred by this immunity.24 Moreover, Indian tribes are subject to suit
where “Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its
immunity.”25 As to the latter, there was some historical uncertainty as to
whether “tribes could waive their own sovereign immunity without
congressional approval.”26 Today, however, tribes may waive their
immunity either by law or by contract, provided they do so “clearly.”27 And
so, where a tribe voluntarily agrees to a binding arbitration clause and state
courts have jurisdiction over the resulting arbitration, the tribe has waived
its immunity.28 That decision, however, in C & L Enterprises v. Citizen
Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe turned on two key facts: the contract in
question expressly noted that the American Arbitration Association rules
would govern any arbitration and the contract’s choice of law clause “made
it clear that the parties had selected Oklahoma law as the applicable law.”29
Clearly, tribal waiver of immunity is a fact-specific question, drawing on
the actions of the tribe at issue and the nature of the suit brought. Therefore,
whether tribes have waived immunity from suit under the FMLA is a
question beyond the scope of this paper. Courts have addressed many novel
21. See id. § 7.05(1)(a), at 638 (citing Fletcher v. United States, 116 F.3d 1315, 1324
(10th Cir. 1997); Hardin v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 779 F2d. 476, 479 (9th Cir.
1985)).
22. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978) (citing Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908)).
23. Id.
24. United States v. Yakima Tribal Court, 806 F.2d 853, 861 (9th Cir. 1986). Tribes are,
however, immune from suits against them by states. See Florida v. Seminole Tribe, 181 F.3d
1237, 1241 (11th Cir. 1999).
25. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 755 (1998).
26. COHEN, supra note 14, § 7.05(1)(c), at 643 & n.51 (citing Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe,
66 F. 372, 376 (8th Cir. 1895) (“[T]he United States has never given its permission that
these Indian Nations might be sued generally, even with their consent.”)).
27. See id. § 7.05, at 644 & n.52.
28. C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S.
411, 419 (2001).
29. COHEN, supra note 14, § 7.05(1)(c), at 644 (citing C & L Enters., 532 U.S. at 419).
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arguments under this principle of sovereignty in relation to the FMLA,
however. In Muller v. Morongo Casino, Resort, and Spa, a slot attendant at
the Morongo Casino, Crystal Muller, alleged that the Morongo Indian Tribe
had waived sovereign immunity from suit under the FMLA by entering into
a gaming compact with the State of California.30 The court found that the
Tribe had not waived immunity under the FMLA because, although the
compact did contain waivers for “different categories of claims” unrelated
to the FMLA, there was no “clear waiver of immunity from suit for
employment-related claims.”31 Even though the Tribe recognized that
Muller had rights under the FMLA, it had not clearly expressed intent to
waive sovereign immunity from suit and, therefore, Muller could not sue to
enforce those rights.32
Clarity is also required for the United States to authorize lawsuits against
tribes. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the Supreme Court was adamant
that any abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity from suit by Congress
“‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.’”33 Historically,
Congress has been rather stingy with its ability to waive this immunity. For
example, tribal immunity from suit was only partially waived in the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968,34 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,35 and other
congressional acts.36 The Bankruptcy Code, which waives the sovereign
immunity defense of “any ‘governmental unit,’”37 may even have failed to

30. Muller v. Morongo Casino, Resort, & Spa, No. EDCV 14-02308-VAP (KKx), 2015
WL 3824160, at *1, *6 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2015).
31. Id. at *6-7.
32. Id.
33. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (quoting United States v.
Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976)).
34. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303
(2012)), cited in COHEN, supra note 14, § 705(1)(b), at 640.
35. Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 27012721 (2012)), discussed in COHEN, supra note 14, § 705(1)(b), at 641.
36. See COHEN, supra note 14, § 705(1)(b), at 641 & nn. 35-38 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365
(2012) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i)(1)(C) (2012) (Safe Drinking Water Act); 42
U.S.C. § 6972 (2012) (Resources Conservation and Recovery Act); 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5125
(2012) (Hazardous Materials Transportation Act)).
37. Id. § 705(1)(b), at 642 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (2012)) (defining governmental
unit as “United States; State; Commonwealth; District; Territory; municipality; foreign state;
department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States . . . , a State, a Commonwealth, a
District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state; or other foreign or domestic
government.”)).
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waive tribal sovereign immunity from suit.38 At times, Congress has
considered “broader abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity,” at least in
the context of regulations pertaining to contracting with tribes, but declined
to enact any such proposals.39
Simply, the default position regarding tribes is “immunity; and to
abrogate such immunity, Congress must unequivocally express that
purpose.”40 Therefore, anything short of a clear, unequivocal expression in
the FMLA that Congress intended to waive tribal immunity from suit for
violations of this law will be insufficient. Congress did not merely fail to
make a sufficiently clear expression; rather, it failed to make any expression
as to tribal sovereign immunity at all.41 As several courts have noted, the
FMLA falls well short of waiving tribal sovereign immunity, rendering
individuals incapable of suing their tribal employers for failure to afford
them rights under the law.42 Therefore, as it pertains to the FMLA, lawsuits
by private individuals are not an available means for enforcing the law.
Enforcing the FMLA is limited to suit by the federal government and there
has yet to be such a suit. Nonetheless, “whether an Indian tribe is subject to
a statute and whether the tribe may be sued for violating the statute are two
entirely different questions.”43

38. See In re Whitaker, 474 B.R. 687, 695 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Cattle
Cong., 247 B.R. 259 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000).
39. COHEN, supra note 14, § 7.05(1)(b), at 643.
40. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2031 (2014) (internal
quotations and alterations omitted).
41. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2012).
42. See Carsten v. Inter-Tribal Council of Nev., 599 F. App’x 659, 660 (9th Cir. 2015)
(“The district court correctly held that the FMLA does not abrogate tribal sovereign
immunity.”); Chayoon v. Chao, 355 F.3d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The FMLA makes no
reference to the amenity of Indian tribes to suit.”); Morrison v. Viejas Enters., No.
11cv97WQH(BGS), 2011 WL 3203107, at *1, *3 (S.D. Cal. July 26, 2011) (“The Family
Medical Leave Act is a law of general application that is silent with respect to Indian
tribes.”); Pearson v. Chugach Gov. Servs. Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 467, 477 (D. Del. 2009)
(“The only courts to examine whether tribal organizations are subject to the FMLA's
employer obligations held, based on the doctrine of tribal immunity, th[at] there is not [a]
private cause of action under the FMLA against tribal organizations.”); Myers v. Seneca
Niagara Casino, 488 F. Supp. 2d 166, 169 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Thus, Congress has not
expressly abrogated the sovereignty of Indian Nations in the FMLA, and Congress must
expressly do so for there to be an effective abrogation.”).
43. Fla. Paraplegic Ass’n, Inc. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d 1126,
1130 (11th Cir. 1999).
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B. Applicability of the FMLA to Indian Tribes
Whether the requirements of the FMLA apply to Indian tribes or tribal
businesses is a separate question, speaking to the right of an individual to
demand a tribe’s compliance with the law. As noted, regulation like the
FMLA is indisputably within the purview of each tribe as a sovereign
entity.44 Tribes possess, however, only “a limited sovereignty that is subject
to complete defeasance,” meaning Congress may abrogate a tribe’s
sovereign right to regulate on this subject.45 Unlike abrogation of tribal
sovereign immunity from suit, however, it is unclear what is required of
Congress to abrogate this sovereign right.
Undoubtedly, Congress may affect such abrogation with a clear
expression to do so.46 The FMLA, however, has no such expression.47
Indeed, the FMLA makes no reference at all to Indian tribes. The issue
presented by the FMLA, then, as it pertains to its applicability to Indian
tribes, is whether “congressional silence” operates as “an expression of
intent to exclude tribal enterprises from the scope of an act to which they
would otherwise be subject.”48 That question is, as of yet, unanswered by
the Supreme Court and has been inconsistently answered by the Circuit
Courts of Appeals. The result is that determining whether the requirements
of the FMLA extend to Indian tribes and tribal businesses largely depends
on which appellate jurisdiction hears the dispute.
The various approaches to the applicability of general statutes to Indians
can be grouped, however, into two prevailing strands of jurisprudence
flanked by less popular variations. Most frequently employed by the courts
is an approach coined by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Donovan v.
Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, which presumes the applicability of these
statutes to Indians subject only to three narrow exceptions.49 On the
contrary, other courts employ a presumption of non-applicability, holding
that general statutes can reach only as far as the legislature expressly

44. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985) (“No
one doubts that the Tribe has the inherent right to regulate the health and safety of workers
in tribal enterprises.”).
45. Id. at 1115.
46. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149 (1982).
47. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2012).
48. Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d at 1115.
49. Id. at 1115-16.
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intended.50 A third, significantly less favored approach, determines
applicability of a general statute based on the nature of the Indian activity
that the statute would regulate, applying statutes that would govern
“commercial enterprises” to Indians but not those that would affect
traditional “governmental functions.”51 As with any decisional law doctrine,
there are outliers and inconsistencies. For the most part, however, the
dispute as to how the courts should adjudicate laws of general applicability
centers on where the court should place the presumption.
1. Precedent
a) SCOTUS
The root of inconsistency at the appellate level is inconsistency at the
Supreme Court, resulting specifically from the Court’s decision in Federal
Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation.52 Tuscarora presented a
challenge to the applicability of the Federal Power Act, which authorized
power companies to condemn lands “necessary to the construction,
maintenance, or operation” of a project licensed by the Federal Power
Commission, to reservation lands.53 In the end, the Court held that the
Federal Power Act authorized the condemnation of Indian lands for
licensed projects, despite the Tuscarora Indian Nation’s objections that the
taking of Indian lands would require “the express consent of Congress
referring specifically to those lands.”54 Tuscarora’s appellate progeny, at
least regarding the applicability of “a general statute in terms applying to all
persons,” dovetails not from the Court’s holding, but from its dictum.55 The
Court opined that while it may once have been that “‘[g]eneral acts of
congress did not apply to Indians, unless so expressed as to clearly manifest
an intention to include them’ . . . , it is now well settled by many decisions
of th[e] Court that a general statute . . . includes Indians and their property
interests.”56 While the Tuscarora dictum has been the lodestar for many
50. This approach has been used in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, see infra text
accompanying notes 146-154 & 160-176, and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, see infra text
accompanying notes 155-159.
51. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. N.L.R.B., 475 F.3d 1306, 1313 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
52. 362 U.S. 99 (1960).
53. Id. at 115.
54. Id. at 118.
55. Id. at 116 (quoting Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99 (1884)).
56. Id.; see also Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Comm'r, 295 U.S. 418
(1935); Chouteau v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 38 F.2d 976 (10th Cir. 1930).
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courts confronting questions of general applicability, other courts have
noted that this language is inconsistent with other decisions of the Supreme
Court.
In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,57 for example, the Supreme Court
used language inconsistent with Tuscarora that suggested congressional
silence “cannot signal an undermining of established tribal authority.”58 The
Court granted certiorari in Merrion to determine whether the Jicarilla
Apache Tribe had the authority to impose a severance tax on “any oil and
natural gas severed, saved, and removed from Tribal lands.”59 The Tribe
had enacted the statute that created this tax pursuant to its constitution,
which afforded the tribal council the authority to “levy and collect taxes and
fees on tribal members, and . . . to impose taxes and fees on non-members
of the tribe doing business on the reservation.”60 Though this tax was a
proper exercise of authority by the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, the Court
acknowledged that the United States federal government had the authority
to divest the Tribe of this power.61 The issue, then, was whether the federal
government had done so.
One argument raised by the oil and gas producers challenging the tax
imposed upon them by the Jicarilla Apache Tribe was that “Congress
implicitly took away” the Tribe’s power to impose this tax.62 The Court
noted that Congress had enacted several pieces of legislation, relied upon
by the parties challenging the tax, relating to taxation of this sort.63 None of
that legislation, however, provided a “clear indication[],” as was required
by the Merrion Court, that Congress intended to deprive the Jicarilla
Apache Tribe of its taxing authority.64 Congressional silence, at best,
instructed the Court that there was an ambiguity as to the Tribe’s authority,
and any doubt must be resolved in the Tribe’s favor to comport with
“traditional notions of sovereignty and with the federal policy of
encouraging tribal independence.”65 Indeed, the Court provided a helpful
summation of Merrion on this question: “a proper respect both for tribal
sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of Congress in this area
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

455 U.S. 130 (1982).
KAIGHN SMITH, JR., LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW IN INDIAN COUNTRY 53 (2011).
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 133 (1982).
Id. at 135.
Id. at 149 (noting “Congress may limit tribal sovereignty”).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 152.
Id. (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1980)).
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cautions that we tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of
legislative intent.”66 Unfortunately, the Court stopped short of indicating
whether the caution of Merrion abrogated Tuscarora’s broad language.
The Court had another opportunity to nullify the Tuscarora dictum in
Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante.67 There, the Court addressed
whether a federal district court could exercise diversity jurisdiction over a
dispute involving both members of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe and events
that occurred within the Blackfeet Tribal Reservation without first allowing
the tribal court system to determine its own jurisdiction.68 Edward LaPlante
brought suit in Blackfeet Tribal Court against Iowa Mutual Insurance
Company alleging the Company acted in bad-faith when it refused to settle
his claims arising from a traffic accident in which LaPlante was driving his
employer’s vehicle.69
LaPlante’s suit turned on his employer’s liability, which would be
imputed to Iowa Mutual, the employer’s insurer.70 Iowa Mutual sought to
have the insurance dispute heard in federal court based, in part, on the
assertion that the existence of a federal diversity statute displaces, by
implication, deference to tribal courts in matters involving tribal members
or tribal lands.71
As in Merrion, the LaPlante Court rejected the notion that a statute silent
as to its implications for Indian tribes could operate as a limit on tribal
sovereignty.72 Though the United States federal government did have the
authority to limit the jurisdiction of tribal courts, the Court declined to
“read the general grant of diversity jurisdiction” by federal statute—absent
either an explicit reference to Indians or evidence in the legislative history
that Indians were considered in crafting the legislation—as having done
so.73 Admittedly, the historical backdrop of the federal diversity statute
66. Id. at 149 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978)).
67. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
68. Id. at 11 (“The question before us is whether a federal court may exercise diversity
jurisdiction before the tribal court system has an opportunity to determine its own
jurisdiction.”).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 17-18 (“Although Congress undoubtedly has the power to limit tribal court
jurisdiction, we do not read the general grant of diversity jurisdiction to have implemented
such a significant intrusion on tribal sovereignty . . . .”).
72. Id. at 18 (“In the absence of any indication that Congress intended the diversity
statute to limit the jurisdiction of the tribal courts, we decline petitioner’s invitation to hold
that tribal sovereignty can be impaired in this fashion.”).
73. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol42/iss1/5

No. 1]

COMMENTS

217

made Iowa Mutual’s position unlikely to prevail because nearly no tribal
courts existed when the statute was enacted.74 Moreover, the application of
the federal diversity statute turns on citizenship and for much of American
history Indians were not considered citizens of either states or sovereign
tribes, rendering the diversity statute inapplicable.75 Nonetheless, the Court
spoke broadly in LaPlante and declared that “[i]n the absence of any
indication that Congress intended the diversity statute to limit the
jurisdiction of tribal courts, . . . tribal sovereignty can[not] be impaired in
this fashion.”76 Unlike in Tuscarora, the LaPlante Court found no
significance in the combination of a statute’s generality and silence as to its
applicability to Indians.
b) Presumption of Applicability77
One of the earliest attempts at sorting out the effect of statutes of general
applicability to Indian tribes is the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision
in Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, finding that the Occupational
Safety and Health Act78 (“OSHA”) “applie[d] to the commercial activities
carried on by the Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm.”79 Coeur d’Alene pitted an
Indian-owned commercial grain farm that sold its product on the open
market against the United States Department of Labor, which had
conducted a “consensual inspection of two grain elevators on the Farm.” 80
Having been cited for twenty-one violations of OSHA, which were
accompanied by a proposed $185 fine, the Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm
challenged the applicability of OSHA to Indians.81
Of course, Congress can expressly apply a statute to Indians.82 Laws of
general applicability that are silent as to their application to Indians,
however, present a problem. The Ninth Circuit was not shy about its
endorsement of the Supreme Court’s dictum in Tuscarora, that “a general
statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their property

74. Id. at 17-18.
75. Id. at 18.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. This term was first used by Alex T. Skibine. See Alex T. Skibine, Practical
Reasoning and the Application of General Federal Regulatory Laws to Indian Nations, 22
WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 123, 130 (2016).
78. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2012).
79. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 1985).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1114-15.
82. Id. at 1116.
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interests.”83 The court did, however, recognize three exceptions to
Tuscarora’s general principle, which were borrowed from an earlier Ninth
Circuit case regarding the applicability of federal criminal laws to activities
on reservation lands.84 And so, within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit,
federal laws of general applicability are valid against Indians unless (1) the
statute would affect “exclusive rights of self-governance in purely
intramural matters,” (2) the law would “abrogate rights guaranteed by
Indian treaties,” or (3) there is evidence that Congress “intended [the law]
not to apply to Indians.”85 The Ninth Circuit has continually affirmed this
rule.86
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals followed suit, incorporating the
Coeur d’Alene framework in a dispute over the applicability of OSHA to an
Indian-run business, Mashantucket Sand and Gravel.87 There the court was
urged by Mashantucket Sand and Gravel to apply a framework similar to
what now controls in the Eighth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals,
wherein a law applies to tribes only if Congress expressly intended to
abrogate tribal sovereignty.88
Notably, Mashantucket Sand and Gravel proposed a hybrid test resulting
from the Supreme Court’s opinions since Tuscarora,89 specifically United
States v. Dion90 and LaPlante.91 The result of Dion and LaPlante, the Tribe
argued, is that “[i]f an act would interfere with rights of tribal selfgovernance in internal matters then the court must conclude that the act
does not apply”—a conclusion that “can only be overcome if it is clear . . .

83. Id. at 1115-16 (quoting Federal Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora, 362 U.S. 99, 116
(1960)) (“In short, we have not adopted the proposition that Indian tribes are subject only to
those laws of the United States expressly made applicable to them. Nor do we do so here.”).
84. Id. at 1116 (quoting United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1980)).
85. Id. at 1114 (quoting Farris, 624 F.2d at 893-94).
86. See Solis v. Matheson, 563 F.3d 425 (2009); Lumber Indus. Pension Fund v. Warm
Springs Forest Prods. Indus., 939 F.2d 683 (1991) (“In general, in the absence of an
expressed exemption for Indians, ‘a general statute in terms applying to all persons includes
Indians and their property interests.’”); U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm’n, 935 F.2d 182 (1991).
87. Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 1996).
88. Id. at 177 (“MSG would have us start with the presumption that federal statutes of
general applicability touching upon sovereign rights of Indians do not apply to tribes, absent
a clear indication of Congress’s intent that the statute override tribal sovereignty.”).
89. Federal Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora, 362 U.S. 99 (1960).
90. 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
91. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
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that Congress intended that the act apply in spite of this interference.”92 In
the end, the court rejected this proposed standard as too broad, and adopted
the view that a statute of general applicability is presumed to apply to
Indians, barring the three Coeur d’Alene exceptions.93 The only exception
at issue was the first, by which a general statute is not applicable to Indians
if it affects “exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural
matters.”94 Because Mashantucket Sand and Gravel conducted activities
that were commercial, employed non-Indians—which the court held should
“weigh[] heavily against” Mashantucket Sand and Gravel—and was
involved in the construction of a casino to engage in interstate commerce,
the court felt that applying OSHA did not affect rights of self-governance in
purely intramural matters.95
So, too, did the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Florida Paraplegic
Ass’n v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida.96 There, the Florida
Paraplegic Association and the Association for Disabled Americans alleged
that a restaurant owned by the Miccosukee Tribe of Florida failed to meet
the standards of accessibility for disabled persons required by the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).97 The Miccosukee Tribe moved
to dismiss the action under claims of sovereign immunity from suit.98 To be
fair, the Tribe was correct that the ADA had not waived sovereign
immunity from suit.99 However, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the Coeur
d’Alene framework and determined that application of the ADA to the
Miccosukee Tribe was neither an abrogation of “rights guaranteed under an
Indian treaty,” contradiction of “Congress’s intent,”100 nor interference
“with purely intramural matters touching exclusive rights of self92. Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d at 178 (citing Appellee’s Brief at
20, Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel (No. 95-4200)).
93. Id. at 182.
94. Id. at 176 (citation omitted).
95. Id. at 179-81.
96. 166 F.3d 1126, 1129 (11th Cir. 1999) (“As the district court recognized, a general
statute applies to Indian tribes unless its application would (1) abrogate rights guaranteed
under an Indian treaty, (2) interfere with purely intramural matters touching exclusive rights
of self-government, or (3) contradict Congress’s intent.”).
97. Fla. Paraplegic, 166 F.3d at 1127 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (2012)(a) (2012)).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1135 (“Because we find that Congress did not unequivocally express an intent
to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity from private suit under Title III of the ADA, we hold
that the Associations may not pursue this action against the Miccosukee Tribe.”).
100. Id. at 1129 (“The Associations and the Miccosukee Tribe agree that no treaty
relevant to this case exists and that Congress has not specifically expressed its intent that the
ADA not apply to Indian tribes.”).
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government.”101 The court focused on the last of the three exceptions,
finding that interstate commercial activities conducted by tribes do not
constitute intramural matters of self-governance.102 This rule remains a vital
component of the Eleventh Circuit’s approach to laws of general
applicability.103
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals adoption of the Coeur d’Alene
approach has been more contentious than its counterparts. In NLRB v. Little
River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Government, a divided panel of the
Sixth Circuit adopted the Coeur d’Alene presumption of applicability104
over the boisterous dissent of Judge McKeague, which can be distilled into
a single rhetorical question: “How does one statement of dictum, in a 1960
Supreme Court opinion, grow into a ‘doctrine,’ contrary to traditional
principles of Indian law, yet justifying federal intrusion upon tribal
sovereignty in 2015?”105 The dissent is neither alone nor without merit, as
other courts have adopted the view that resolves the judge’s concerns, infra.
Nonetheless, the majority of the Sixth Circuit panel found that “the Coeur
d’Alene framework accommodates principles of federal and tribal
sovereignty,” “reflects the teachings” of the Supreme Court, and supplies
“Indian tribes with the opportunity to show that a generally applicable
federal statute should not apply to them.”106 The court held that the National
Labor Relations Act107 (“NLRA”) did “not undermine the Band’s right of
self-governance in purely intramural matters,” that Congress did not
“intend[] the NLRA not to apply to a tribal government’s operation of tribal
gaming,” and that the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians had no treaty at
issue.108 The Little River Band, then, could not “regulate labor-organizing

101. Id. at 1129-30 (“We hold, therefore, that because the ADA is a generally applicable
law and because no exception to the presumption that such statutes apply to Indian tribes
controls this case, Title III of the ADA governs the Miccosukee Tribe in its operation of its
gaming and restaurant facility.”).
102. Id. at 1129 (“[T]ribe-run business enterprises acting in interstate commerce do not
fall under the ‘self-governance’ exception to the rule that general statutes apply to Indian
tribes.”).
103. See Williams v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 839 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2016).
104. 788 F.3d 537, 551 (6th Cir. 2015) (“We therefore adopt the Coeur d’Alene
framework to resolve this case.”).
105. Id. at 565 (McKeague, C.J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 551.
107. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012).
108. Little River Band, 788 F.3d at 555.
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activities and collective bargaining” in a way inconsistent with the
NLRA.109
One month later, another Sixth Circuit panel addressed the applicability
of the NLRA on appeal by the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of
Michigan.110 A casino operated by this Tribe, the Soaring Eagle Casino and
Resort, had terminated an employee allegedly in violation of provisions of
the NLRA.111 When the employee sought redress through the NLRB, the
Tribe objected on sovereignty grounds.112 While more sympathetic to the
Tribe’s argument than the last Sixth Circuit panel to address the issue,
delivering a multi-page criticism of the Coeur d’Alene framework, the court
was nonetheless bound by the Little River Band precedent and upheld the
applicability of the NLRA to the Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort.113
A number of courts that have addressed whether a general statute, silent
as to its relationship with Indians, applies nonetheless to Indians have
implemented the Tuscarora presumption of applicability subject only to the
Coeur d’Alene exceptions. The chronology of these cases, moreover,
reflects Coeur d’Alene’s growing vitality over time. The Seventh Circuit,
however, has moved away from its endorsement of Coeur d’Alene, at least
insofar as it has altered the exception to that rule.

109. The court described the Tribe’s regulation in the following way:
In 2005, the Tribal Council enacted the Band's Fair Employment Practices
Code (FEPC), which it amended most recently on July 28, 2010. In pertinent
part, . . . [a]s amended, Article XVI, inter alia, grants to the Band the authority
to determine the terms and conditions under which collective bargaining may
or may not occur; prohibits strikes, work stoppage, or slowdown by the Band's
employees and, specifically, by casino employees . . . . Further, Article XVI
prohibits the requirement of membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment. It also prohibits the deduction of union dues, fees, or
assessments from the wages of employees unless the employee has presented,
and the Band has received, a signed authorization of such deduction. As
amended, Article XVII prohibits Band employers, such as the casino, from
giving testimony or producing documents in response to requests or subpoenas
issued by non-tribal authorities engaged in investigations or proceedings on
behalf of current or former employees, when such employees have failed to
exhaust their remedies under the FEPC.
Id. at 540-41.
110. Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 2509 (2016).
111. Id. at 653.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 675.
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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals appears to be marred by
uncertainty as to what standard governs decisions surrounding inquiries into
laws of general applicability.114 In 1989, only four years after the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals issued Coeur d’Alene, the Seventh Circuit was
asked to determine whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”)115 applied to the Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Tribe such that its provisions governed whether State Farm
Insurance Company could be made to pay a claim for particular treatments
that it believed were related to a preexisting condition.116 The district court
determined that the dispute between Alton Smart, whose claim had been
denied, and State Farm arose under ERISA such that the company’s
decision was reversible only upon finding it was “arbitrary and
capricious.”117
The court employed Tuscarora and Coeur d’Alene. As to whether there
existed any treaty rights that precluded the presumption of applicability, the
court found that “[s]imply because a treaty exists does not by necessity
compel a conclusion that a federal statute of general applicability is not
binding on an Indian Tribe.”118 Indeed, under this exception, “[t]he critical
issue is whether application of the statute would jeopardize a right that is
secured by the treaty.”119 In Smart v. State Farm Insurance Co., it did
not.120 Nor was there any evidence of congressional intent that ERISA
would not apply to Indians.121 Finally, and most importantly for
understanding the Seventh Circuit’s evolution, the court held that an
argument that application of ERISA would affect tribal “self-governance as
broadly conceived” was insufficient under the exception that would
preclude applicability where “the statute threatens the Tribe’s ability to
govern its intramural affairs.”122 Therefore, ERISA applied to the Lac Du
Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Tribe.123
Subsequently, however, when asked whether a federal district court had
the authority to enforce a subpoena against the Great Lakes Indian Fish and
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

SMITH, supra note 58, at 59-61.
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2012).
Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 930.
Id. at 934-35.
Id. at 935.
Id.
Id. at 936.
Id. at 935.
Id. at 938.
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Wildlife Commission under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”),124 the
Seventh Circuit analyzed the question outside of the Coeur d’Alene
framework and held that it did not.125 The Great Lakes Indian Fish and
Wildlife Commission (“Great Lakes Commission”) is a “consortium” of
more than a dozen Chippewa Indian tribes from the Great Lakes region.126
Tasked with enforcing the usufructuary rights of these tribes, the Great
Lakes Commission creates and enforces regulations regarding fishing,
hunting, and harvesting wild plant life on behalf of the tribes.127 During
hunting and fishing seasons within the Great Lakes Commission’s
regulatory umbrella, employees work “virtually round the clock,” for a
number of reasons.128 The Department of Labor sought to enforce a
provision, which may have been no more than a loophole, which would
require the Great Lakes Commission to pay “time and a half” for any hours
beyond forty worked in a single week.129 Because the Great Lakes
Commission “admit[ted] that it d[id] not pay time and a half for overtime,”
the Seventh Circuit needed only to answer “the question of statutory
coverage.”130
The Seventh Circuit’s decision relied heavily on the conclusion that the
Great Lakes Commission was covered by tribal sovereignty such that
Congress would have to “give[] a stronger indication than it ha[d in the
FLSA] that it wants to intrude.”131 A motivating factor in the court’s
classification of the Great Lakes Commission’s work as a sovereign
function of tribal government was the understanding that Indians are
allowed to regulate their police, and the employees at the Commission were
essentially officers policing hunting and fishing.132

124. 29 U.S.C §§ 201-219 (2012).
125. Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Comm’n, 4 F.3d 490, 495 (7th Cir.
1993).
126. Id. at 492.
127. Id. at 492-93.
128. Id. at 492 (noting long hours result “not only because the hours of daylight are long
and hunting and fishing take place throughout them, but also because the Indians like to
spear fish at night, by torchlight”).
129. Id. at 492-93 (“Because the Fair Labor Standards Act does not mention Indians, the
Department of Labor takes the position that the[] exemptions [available to state or local
governments] are inapplicable to the warden-policemen of the Great Lakes Indian Fish and
Wildlife Commission.”).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 495.
132. Id.
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The dissent in Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Commission,
however, was unpersuaded that the Great Lakes Commission was engaged
in policing sufficient to constitute a sovereign function of tribal
government, citing the fact that the employees in question were “not
employees of a public agency” and “d[id] not have the general arrest
powers of policemen,” though there had been opportunities for the Great
Lakes Commission employees to be “bestow[ed] full police powers.”133
In the end, the court differentiated Reich from cases where federal
statutes of general applicability had been applied to Indian agencies because
the latter had the effect of imposing regulation merely on “routine activities
of a commercial or service character.”134 This decision has been
characterized as aligning with the Tenth Circuit’s position that, “absent a
clear expression of congressional intent, federal courts must presume that
Congress would not undermine” the exercise of sovereign functions of
tribal government.135 In the Seventh Circuit, then, Reich would suggest that
congressional intent is the arbiter of disputes regarding the effect of statutes
of general applicability on the sovereign functions of tribal government.
In recent years, however, the Seventh Circuit has retreated somewhat
from the sovereignty-leaning approach it promulgated in Reich. In
Menominee Tribal Enterprises v. Solis, the court had to determine whether
OSHA applied to the Menominee Indian Tribe’s sawmill in Wisconsin.136
Following the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Tuscarora, the court held that
“statutes of general applicability that do not mention Indians are
nevertheless usually held to apply to them,” subject to three exceptions that
differ in part from Coeur d’Alene.137 First, as in Coeur d’Alene, a statute of
general applicability is inapplicable to Indians if there is “persuasive
evidence that Congress did not intend” it to so apply.138 Second, again in
accord with the Ninth Circuit, a statute of general applicability is
inapplicable to Indians if its application would “clash with rights granted
Indians by other statutes or by treaties with Indian tribes.”139
Finally, the court found that general statutes would be inapplicable to
Indians if their application would “interfere with tribal governance,”
diverging from the “intramural matters” approach of the other courts that
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 504 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
Id. at 495.
SMITH, supra note 58, at 60.
Menominee Tribal Enters. v. Solis, 601 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 670.
Id. at 671.
Id.
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have adopted this framework.140 Notably, in Menominee, the court cast
Reich as an example of this exception: that a statute of general applicability
“will be held inapplicable to Indians if it would interfere with tribal
governance.”141
However, outside of the dissent, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Reich
did not even mention Tuscarora, let alone allude to it as a governing
principle in disputes over statutes of general applicability. Menominee is,
then, at least a minor retreat from the abrogation of Tuscarora and Coeur
d’Alene. The retreat may be purely rhetorical in nature, however, because
other courts have limited this exception to require the statute of general
applicability to affect “exclusive rights of self-governance in purely
intramural matters.”142 The Seventh Circuit’s phrasing, which requires any
“interfere[nce] with tribal governance,” is more deferential to tribal
sovereignty, especially as it pertains to the type of “regulatory functions
exercised by the [Great Lakes] Commission” in Reich.143 The Seventh
Circuit, perhaps, remains dedicated to exercising “forbearance in construing
legislation as having invaded the central regulatory functions of a sovereign
entity.”144 While the presumption of applicability survives in the Seventh
Circuit, it does so in a softened form, providing more wiggle room for
challenges to the applicability of general statutes to Indians.
c) Presumption of Non-applicability145
While the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals crafted a more generous
modification of Tuscarora than the Ninth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals rejected Tuscarora altogether. Donovan v. Navajo Forest
Products Industries, similar to Coeur d’Alene in the Ninth Circuit,
addressed the applicability of OSHA to the activities of Navajo Forest
Products Industries, a company controlled by the tribal government.146 An
Occupational Safety and Health Commission compliance officer cited
Navajo Forest Products Industries for “one serious and 53 other-thanserious violations,” proposing a penalty of more than $4,000.147 Navajo
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985)
(emphasis added).
143. SMITH, supra note 58, at 61 (quoting Solis, 601 F.3d at 671).
144. Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Comm’n, 4 F.3d at 495.
145. Once more, first used by Alex T. Skibine. See Skibine, supra note 77, at 130.
146. Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prods. Indus., 692 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1982).
147. Id. at 710.
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Forest Products is, essentially, an opinion in two parts.148 In the first part,
the court opined a holding consistent with the second exception recognized
by the Ninth Circuit—that statutes of general applicability are nonetheless
not applicable to Indian tribes if the law would “be in derogation of
Indians’ treaty rights.”149 Indeed, the Navajo Tribe of Indians was party to a
treaty with the United States that limited the right of entry onto Navajo land
to those individuals entering “in discharge of duties imposed by law.”150
The court found that the history and purpose of this treaty language has
effectively dictated “that the only federal personnel authorized to enter the
reservation are those specifically so authorized to deal with Indian
affairs.”151 OSHA included no such specific authorization. Within the Ninth
Circuit’s Coeur d’Alene framework, this conclusion alone would support
the determination that OSHA did not apply to the activities of Navajo
Forest Products Industries. The court, however, went further, holding that
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Merrion “limit[ed] or, by implication,
overrule[d] Tuscarora [] at least to the extent . . . ‘that a general statute in
terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their property
interests.’”152 The court acknowledged that “[t]he United States retains
legislative plenary power to divest Indian tribes of any attributes of
sovereignty,” and reasoned that “[a]bsent some expression of such
legislative intent, however, . . . divestiture of tribal power to manage
reservation lands” should not be permitted solely on a legal presumption
that general statutes apply to Indians.153
The presumption of applicability, in the Tenth Circuit, has been turned
on its head. In EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, the court clarified the rule that
follows from Donovan,
We believe that unequivocal Supreme Court precedent dictates
that in cases where ambiguity exists (such as that posed by the
ADEA’s silence with respect to Indians), and there is no clear
indication of congressional intent to abrogate Indian sovereignty
rights (as manifested, e.g., by the legislative history, or the
existence of a comprehensive statutory plan), the court is to

148. SMITH, supra note 58, at 56-57.
149. Navajo Forest Prods., 692 F.2d at 711.
150. Id.
151. Id. (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 713 (quoting Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99,
116 (1960)).
153. Id. at 714.
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apply the special canons of construction to the benefit of Indian
interests.154
In tow by the Tenth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held
that Tuscarora’s language was inapplicable when the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission brought action under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act155 against the Fond du Lac Heavy Equipment and
Construction Company, owned by the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Tribe.156 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act is
assuredly a statute of general applicability and makes no mention of its
applicability to Indians.157 Nonetheless, the court was unpersuaded in
regards to the applicability of Tuscarora because the case presented an
issue of the statute’s applicability to “a specific right reserved to the
Indians,” though not one based in treaty.158 The Eighth Circuit requires,
then, “some affirmative evidence of congressional intent, either in the
language of its statute or its legislative history,” to apply statutes of this
type to Indian tribes.159
The Tenth Circuit does have some jurisprudential outliers, however, such
as Nero v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma.160 R.H. Nero was one of many
descendants of slaves owned by the Cherokee Nation who brought suit,
alleging that they were afforded “the rights and privileges of Cherokee
citizenship, although they are not of Cherokee blood,” by an 1866 treaty
between the United States and the Cherokee Nation.161 The Cherokee
Nation asserted sovereignty as a defense to the suit, to which the
descendants responded by noting a number of statutory schemes that they
believed authorized the action.162 The court analyzed the statutes under the
Coeur d’Alene framework, holding that because “no right is more integral
to a tribe’s self-governance than its ability to establish its membership,”
154. EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1989).
155. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2012).
156. EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equip. & Const. Co., Inc., 986 F.2d 246 (8th Cir.
1993).
157. SMITH, supra note 58, at 58-59.
158. Fond du Lac, 986 F.2d at 248 (“Both parties acknowledge that Fond du Lac Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa is a federally recognized Indian tribe. Inherent in the tribe’s quasisovereignty is the tribe’s power to ‘make their own substantive law in internal matters and to
enforce that law in their own forums.’”).
159. Id. at 250.
160. 892 F.2d 1457 (10th Cir. 1989).
161. Id. at 1458.
162. Id. at 1458-59.
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applying the statutes in question to the Cherokee Nation would “affect the
Tribe’s right to self-governance in a purely internal matter.”163 While the
language used to assess one of the exceptions is different, the fact remains
that in Nero the court strayed from its assessment of Tuscarora as having
been abrogated by the Supreme Court.
The court corrected its course toward, but not directly in accord with, a
presumption of inapplicability in NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan.164 Pueblo of
San Juan was first heard by the Tenth Circuit in 2000 and later heard on
rehearing en banc in 2002. The dispute asked whether the Pueblo of San
Juan, an Indian Tribe, “ha[d] the authority to enact and enforce a right-towork tribal ordinance prohibiting union security agreements from
companies engaged in commercial activity on tribal lands,” which the
NLRB challenged as a violation of the NLRA.165 In the first hearing, the
court dismissed the appellants’ reliance on Tuscarora, noting first that “the
NLRA by its terms is not a statute of general application [because] it
excludes states and territories” and second that Donovan acknowledged that
the Supreme Court had “limit[ed] or, by implication, overrule[d]
Tuscarora.”166
In many ways, the Tenth Circuit doubled down on this approach in the
en banc rehearing. In others, however, it retreated, saving the Tuscarora
approach that prevails in the Ninth and Second Circuits from complete
extinction. First, the court reinforced its holding in Navajo Forest Products
Industries, noting that “Congress’ silence as to the tribes can . . . hardly be
taken as an affirmative divestment of [Indian’s] existing ‘general authority,
as sovereign[s], to control economic activity’ on territory within their
jurisdictions.”167 Indeed, this is contrary to the dictum in Tuscarora that
was central in Coeur d’Alene. However, when the Pueblo of San Juan court
turned to Tuscarora, it fell short of concluding that it had been abrogated,
relying instead on its inapplicability to the facts at hand.168 Although, in
Navajo Forest Products Industries, the Tenth Circuit decided that
163. Id. at 1463.
164. 280 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2000).
165. Id. at 1279.
166. Id. at 1283.
167. NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1198 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982)).
168. Id. at 1199 (“Thus Tuscarora is not persuasive here. We are convinced it does not
apply where an Indian tribe has exercised its authority as a sovereign—here, by enacting a
labor regulation—rather than in a proprietary capacity such as that of employer or
landowner.”).
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Tuscarora had been abrogated, twenty years later the court concluded that
Tuscarora persists, but only in a narrow form.
The status of the Tenth Circuit’s position on Tuscarora and Coeur
d’Alene is made less clear by the court’s decision in Shivwits Band of
Paiute Indians v. Utah.169 The Shivwits Band purchased land near a
highway in Utah and leased it to a developer who was utilizing the space
for billboard advertising.170 The state sought to prevent the advertising on
the grounds that it violated state and local law.171 The state was driven in
part by financial incentives offered through the Highway Beautification
Act172 (“HBA”) to states that provide “for effective control of the erection
and maintenance along the Interstate System . . . of outdoor advertising.”173
The dispute regarded, in relevant part, whether the Shivwits Band of Paiute
Indians were subject to the HBA, which dictates that “outdoor
advertising . . . in areas adjacent to the Interstate System . . . should be
controlled . . . to promote the safety and recreational value of public travel,
and to preserve natural beauty.”174
However, as the concurrence noted, the majority disregarded the
question of whether the HBA applied to Indians, focusing instead on the
conclusion that if “the HBA does apply to Indian lands, it is subject to
federal, not state, enforcement.”175 The concurring opinion, however,
engaged in an analysis of the HBA as a general statute and applied the
Coeur d’Alene framework.176 And so, the standing of Tuscarora and Coeur
d’Alene in the Tenth Circuit is unclear. The totality of the court’s decisions,
however, is plainly leaning toward presuming inapplicability in dealing
with general statutes. So, too, is the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
d) Applicability as a Sliding Scale
Confronted by the inconsistencies between its sister courts, the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals has coined a novel approach to laws of general
applicability that draws on the totality of the available jurisprudence.177 As
many of the other cases have, San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Shivwits Band of Paiute Indians v. Utah, 428 F.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 969.
Id. at 970.
23 U.S.C. § 131 (2012).
Shivwits Band, 428 F.3d at 979 (quoting 23 U.S.C. §131(b) (2012)).
Id. (quoting 23 U.S.C. §131(a)).
Id. at 984 (Lucero, J., concurring).
Id. at 984-86 (Lucero, J., concurring).
See San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

230

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

involved the applicability of the NLRA to a casino operated by the San
Manuel Band of Serrano Mission Indians on its reservation.178 The
proceeding arose from a competition between the Communication Workers
of America and the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees
International (“HERE”) unions, each vying to unionize the employees of
the casino.179 HERE alleged that the Tribe had “interfered with, coerced and
restrained employees in the exercise of their [collective bargaining] rights”
by denying HERE access to Casino employees.180 Moreover, HERE
contended that the Tribe had “dominated and discriminatorily supported”
the competing union by allowing it access to the employees to “distribute
leaflets,” “communicate with Casino employees on Casino property during
working hours,” and otherwise attempt to “organiz[e] Casino
employees.”181 As is the usual course of these disputes, the Tribe
challenged the authority of the NLRB to adjudicate the allegations brought
by HERE.182
The D.C. Circuit acknowledged, much like the Tenth and Eighth
Circuits, “conflicting Supreme Court canons of interpretation that are
articulated at a fairly high level of generality,” before crafting a test that it
believes accommodates each of those canons.183 The court reconciled
Tuscarora’s presumption of applicability with later decisions of the
Court—those that other Circuits suggest overrule Tuscarora—by
“recognizing that, in some cases at least, a statute of general application can
constrain the actions of a tribal government without at the same time
impairing tribal sovereignty.”184 The rule employed in San Manuel, then, is
that if “constraint [of the tribe with respect to its governmental functions]
will occur, then tribal sovereignty is at risk and a clear expression of
Congressional intent is necessary.”185 However, “if the general law relates
only to the extra-governmental activities of the tribe, and in particular
activities involving non-Indians, . . . then application of the law might not
impinge on tribal sovereignty” and, presumably, it may be applied without

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 1308-09.
Id.
Id. at 1309.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1310.
Id. at 1312.
Id. at 1313.
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a clear expression of congressional intent.186 In the end, the court held that
the NLRA presented a “negligible” impact on tribal sovereignty, such that
there was no “demand [for] a restrictive construction” of the law.187 And so,
the D.C. Circuit provides the final approach to interpreting laws of general
applicability and their relationship with Indians: the sliding scale approach.
2. Application to the FMLA
a) FMLA as a Law of General Applicability
Before applying any of the existing tests to the FMLA, it must, as a
threshold matter, be shown that the law is one of general applicability that
is silent as to its application to Indians. That the FMLA is silent regarding
Indians has already been noted.188 More difficult is the question of whether
the statute is sufficiently general as to qualify as a law of general
applicability. While, in many instances, courts treat this as an assumed
characteristic of the statutes they are interpreting, some courts have
provided a general rubric. For example, in Reich, the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals considered whether courts have construed the law “liberally, to
apply to the furthest reaches consistent with congressional direction,
recognizing that broad coverage is essential to accomplish its goals.”189
Similarly, in Florida Paraplegic, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
characterized this inquiry as turning on whether the statute is one that
“Congress intended to have broad applicability,” as evidenced by the
language of the law and the definitions it employs.190
By these standards, which are representative of the analysis employed by
other courts, the FMLA is most assuredly a law of general applicability.
The stated purpose of the FMLA was one without limits, noting that
Congress intended “to promote the stability and economic security of
families, and to promote national interests in preserving family integrity.”191
Moreover, Congress considered the “legitimate interests of employers,”
186. Id. (noting that the court “use[s] the term ‘governmental’ in a restrictive sense to
distinguish between the traditional acts governments perform and collateral activities that,
though perhaps in some way related to the foregoing, lie outside their scope”).
187. Id. at 1315.
188. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2012).
189. Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Comm’n, 4 F.3d 490, 499 (7th Cir.
1993) (quoting Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 296 (1985))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
190. Fla. Paraplegic Ass’n, Inc. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d 1126,
1128 (11th Cir. 1999).
191. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2012).
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attempted to “minimize[] the potential for employment discrimination on
the basis of sex by ensuring generally that leave is available . . . on a gender
neutral basis,” and “promote[d] the goal of equal employment opportunity
for women and men.”192 While the FMLA is limited in its reach by
restricting which businesses would be required to abide its demands, this
type of limit has never been sufficient, on its own, to thwart a law’s status
as generally applicable. For example, the FLSA applies only to certain
enterprises, as defined by the statute.193 Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit
found it to be a law of general applicability. Indeed, this determination
generally turns on congressional intent, not on the number of exceptions
found within a law, with one notable exception—the NLRA as interpreted
in Pueblo of San Juan because the law exempts states and territories.194 The
FMLA, however, unlike the NLRA, does not include any broad exceptions
in the coverage for government entities.195 Therefore, the FMLA is most
likely a law of general applicability in any appellate jurisdiction.
b) Silence as a Presumption of Non-Applicability
In those jurisdictions interpreting laws of general applicability that are
silent in their application to Indians as presumptively inapplicable thereto,
the fate of the FMLA is evident. At their most strict, these jurisdictions
refuse to view congressional silence as a “divestment” of a tribe’s sovereign
right to “control economic activity on territory within their jurisdictions.”196
The FMLA, at least in its relationship with Indians, has been nothing more
than silent.197 In the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, where the language
has been somewhat less direct, there must only be “some affirmative
evidence of congressional intent, either in the language of the statute or its
legislative history,” for a law to apply to Indians.198 Even under this lax
standard, however, the FMLA would not apply to Indians because there is
no evidence in its legislative history that Indians were even considered by

192. Id.
193. 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2012).
194. NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 280 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 2000).
195. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2012).
196. NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1198 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
197. See Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2012).
198. EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equip. & Constr. Co., 986 F.2d 246, 250-51 (8th Cir.
1993).
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Congress, let alone that the law was accompanied by any affirmative
intent.199
c) FMLA on the Sliding Scale
Unlike in the jurisdictions in which laws of general applicability are
presumed not to reach Indians, the plight of the FMLA under the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals sliding scale approach is difficult to predict. In the
one instance in which this approach has been employed, the decision turned
on the degree to which applying the statute would constrain governmental
functions.200 In that case, which involved the application of the NLRA to
casino workers, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the law would only be
impacting “extra-governmental activities” and, specifically, “activities
involving non-Indians.” And so, the outcome of a challenge to the
applicability of the FMLA within this approach to the law would turn on
what employer/employee relationship precipitated the suit. Were the
employee one directly involved in implementing governmental programs—
Theresa Carsten, the non-profit employee and director of the Women,
Infants, and Children Program for the ITCN, for example—then the
conclusion would likely be that the FMLA constrains tribal government.201
An employee of a casino or other commercial arm of an Indian tribe,
however, may be capable of receiving the benefits of the FMLA without
similarly constraining governmental functions.202 Indeed, the outcome
could vary even by employee of the same tribe, depending on their
employer or role in an organization. Notably the employer distinction is
fluid, with no bright-line rules having been promulgated by the court.
d) Silence as a Presumption of Applicability
The most often employed approach to laws of general applicability may
be the most difficult to predict, as the Coeur d’Alene presumption of
applicability accounts for several variables. From the outset, however, a
challenge to the FMLA in a jurisdiction following this approach would be
uniquely situated because the law would presumptively cover employees of
Indian tribes. Moreover, one of the three exceptions to that presumption—
triggered by evidence that Congress intended a law to not apply to
199.
(1993).
200.
2007).
201.
202.
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San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1312 (D.C. Cir.
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Indians—would be irrelevant for any review of the FMLA, as both the law
itself and the statutory history are without reference to Indians.203 Evidence
of this silence would evoke a presumption of applicability within this
approach, not an exception to that presumption.
Whether the FMLA would affect any exclusive rights of self-governance
in purely intramural matters is a more difficult question to answer. It seems
evident, however, that commercial activities are unlikely to affect
intramural self-governance. For example, the court in Reich v.
Mashantucket Sand & Gravel found that a commercial activity could be
regulated under OSHA based on the activity’s status as commercial, the fact
that the activity intended to create interstate commerce, and that the tribe
employed non-Indians in the undertaking of that activity.204 It is likely that
few for-profit enterprises will fail to fulfill these requirements. To be sure,
however, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals narrowed the scope even
further, concluding that commercial activities—independent of any other
variable—are not intramural matters of self-governance.205
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals provided a substantive example of
an activity that does constitute intramural governance—policing.206 In
Reich, the Seventh Circuit was clear that the right to manage policing is a
tribal right that is beyond the reach of a silent statute of general
applicability.207 That there was disagreement, moreover, as to whether
Reich actually presented a case of such policing makes a meaningful
substantive point—while government based policing is assuredly
intramural, non-profit or agency based policing (as was the Great Lakes
Commission) occupies a grey area.208 The contours of this exception
become more clear, then: (1) purely for-profit commercial activities are
non-intramural, (2) government activities are likely intramural, and (3) nonprofit and government-delegated activities may be intramural. Of course, in
the Seventh Circuit, as Reich demonstrates, the outcome is slightly different
because any impact on even non-intramural governmental activities will

203. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2012).
204. 95 F.3d 174, 179-81 (2d Cir. 1996).
205. Fla. Paraplegic Ass'n v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d 1126, 1129
(11th Cir. 1999).
206. Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Comm’n, 4 F.3d 490, 495 (7th Cir.
1993).
207. Id.
208. See id. at 504 (Coffey, J., dissenting).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol42/iss1/5

No. 1]

COMMENTS

235

fulfill this exception; hence the conclusion that the Great Lakes
Commission was exempt from the FLSA.209
The final exception—whether any treaty rights would be abrogated by
applying the statute of general applicability to Indians—is the least
predictable, as it is concerned not with broad concepts, but with specific
treaty language. However, “[s]imply because a treaty exists does not by
necessity compel a conclusion that a federal statute of general applicability
is not binding on an Indian Tribe.”210 The issue of treaty rights is often
disposed of through an agreement between the parties.211 When treaty rights
are at issue in a suit, they tend to be on very specific topics.212 The result,
then, is that this exception is rarely the death knell for the application of a
general statute to Indians. The nature of the FMLA and the circumstances
in which it would arise make it likely to be deemed applicable if challenged
in a jurisdiction that follows a version of the Coeur d’Alene presumption of
applicability.
II. Conclusion
While the relationship between Indians and laws of general applicability
remains unclear—and will remain unclear so long as the Supreme Court
continues to deny certiorari on cases that raise the question213—there is a
trend among the lower courts toward the Coeur d’Alene presumption of
applicability approach, with the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals adhering to some version of it. While
this approach offers a fair likelihood that the FMLA will be found to apply
to Indians, that finding is likely to be without benefit to employees like
Theresa Carsten. Once more, whether an individual has the right to demand
a tribe’s compliance with a federal statute and the means by which they can
enforce that statute are separate issues. Therefore, a finding that employees
have a right to demand compliance with the FMLA will not circumvent the
reality that those same employees would have no meaningful path to

209. Id. at 495.
210. Smart v. State Farm Ins., Co., 868 F.2d 929, 934-35 (7th Cir. 1989).
211. See Fla. Paraplegic Ass’n v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d 1126,
1129 (11th Cir. 1999).
212. See Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prods. Indus., 692 F.2d 709, 711; Nero v. Cherokee
Nation of Okla., 892 F.2d 1457, 1458 (10th Cir. 1989).
213. See NLRB v. Little River Band, 788 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.
Ct. 2508 (2016); Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648, 652 (6th Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2509 (2016).
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enforcement because the FMLA definitively does not waive tribal
sovereign immunity from suit.
Nonetheless, the relationship between Indians and laws of general
applicability needs to be addressed, and the Coeur d’Alene presumption of
applicability is the best solution currently available. First, presuming
applicability provides due deference to congressional acts that are intended
to be of broad applicability. Second, the treaty rights exception enables a
court to determine whether any particular tribe has a right to decline
compliance with a law of general applicability based on agreement with the
United States. Third, the intramural self-governance exception ensures that
Congress cannot incidentally impinge on tribal sovereignty. Finally, the
intent exception ensures that tribes will not be accidentally subjected to
federal regulation against the wishes of Congress. The flexibility of this
approach and the manner in which it balances the interests of those
individuals who would benefit from federal regulation against the interests
of those tribes whose activities would be regulated makes it an ideal
solution for all parties.
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